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ple. In any company and also in banks and central banks, leadership could register notable performance as a 
result of harmonization between formal and informal organization of the company. Maintaining a dynamic 
and optimal balance for ensuring the simultaneous attainment of individual aspirations of employees and 
company objectives should be a goal and a permanent preoccupation of the management team. Nowadays, 
leadership of the central banks have to face a multitude of issues that concern accountability and credibil-
ity of monetary authorities. In this regard, one of the essential characteristics that determine and influence 
leadership of a central bank was to ensure that the degree of central bank independence from the political 
authorities of the country concerned. Before and during the international financial crisis, NBR has faced 
some important and difficult periods, watershed might say, in terms of the proper functioning of his leader-
ship. These include: adopting the strategy of monetary policy based on inflation targeting, the speculative 
attack on the currency in the period 17 October to 5 November 2008 and the liquidity crisis of Romanian 
banks with foreign capital.
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1. introduction
This article aims to highlight the im-
portance of leadership at the level of cen-
tral banks, the impact it has style and how 
to involve people in the process of ensur-
ing the functionality of the central bank. 
Understanding correlations and influences 
that the central bank has in the entire bank-
ing system and the national economy is the 
starting point in analyzing how the type of 
leadership adopted and applied at the level 
of national monetary authorities influence 
the thinking and action. 
Regulation of NBR was in the period 
1991-1998 the Law no.34/1991, beginning to 
1998, the Law no. 101/1998 and finally starting 
with 2004 the Law No.312 of 28 June which 
fulfills the Statute of the NBR. Consistent 
with the Statute, the central bank has in a le-
gal plan greater independence, both in the 
context of the new Conditions; Romanian 
banking system and the theoretical approach 
of the role of the monetary authority, which 
currently exist in the world.
The importance of this study is reflected 
by approaching and discussing some impor-
tant problems, arose after the financial crisis, 
in terms of the proper functioning of the cen-
tral bank leadership. These include: adopt-
ing the strategy of monetary policy based 
on inflation targeting, the speculative attack 
on the currency in the period 17 October to 
5 November 2008 and the liquidity crisis of 
Romanian banks with foreign capital.
2. leadership in Central Banks
Leadership could be seen as a process to 
achieve company’s goals through company’s 
people. The literature defines leadership as 
“The action of leading a group of people or 
an organization” and “process of social influ-
ence in which one person can enlist the aid 
and support of others in the accomplishment 
of a common task” (Hill; 2013). 
In any company and also in banks, lead-
ership could register notable performance 
as a result of harmonization between formal 
and informal organization of the company. 
Maintaining a dynamic and optimal balance 
for ensuring the simultaneous attainment 
of individual aspirations of employees and 
company objectives should be a goal and a 
permanent preoccupation of the manage-
ment team. It can be said, in this context, the 
informal structure must be strong enough to 
support formal organization but at the same 
time, must also be flexible enough not to 
dominate or disrupt the normal functioning 
of the system. 
By informal organization one can un-
derstand all groups and spontaneous human 
relations established between employees of 
the same institution, aiming to satisfy their 
personal interests, while formal organization 
can be defined as the design / development 
/ updating of the organizational structure of 
the company, which is represented through 
all positions and departments, how they are 
formed and grouped, and the links that are 
established between them in order to achieve 
objectives.
In pursuing the objective of harmoniz-
ing the formal and informal organization of 
a company, leadership will need to focus on 
the following aspects:
a) find malfunctions such as: failure in 
fulfillment of duties, lack of interest, wast-
ing time, low accountability against the tasks 
received, resistance to change, interpersonal 
or group conflicts. All these are likely to im-
pede the normal functioning of the internal 64 Change and Leadership
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mechanisms and the causes derived exclu-
sively from informal organization of people 
involved.
b)  identify  and  analyze  information 
through: preliminary documentation to de-
termine correct the problem, highlighting 
significant symptoms, identify deficiencies 
and their root-causes.
c) set objectives and measures to influ-
ence informal organization. Selecting the 
way to influence informal organization will 
consider the focus on minimal resources to 
achieve maximum results and comprise: ac-
ceptance and understanding informal struc-
ture, the personal interests of the group, any 
informal structure adversity reactions to the 
measures taken to influence, quick integra-
tion of personal interests and the interests 
of the group, avoiding unnecessary threats 
through formal organization.
There is a strong correlation between 
adjacent objectives and measures and, there-
fore, it is necessary that both the require-
ments and the conditions specified consider a 
consistent set of criteria that we always have 
in the manager carefully.
Leadership is essentially based on deci-
sion taking. Taking decision materialize an 
idea, intention or project in order to respond 
to a specific problem and is a form of social 
validation of an action by putting in motion 
the human, material and financial resources. 
Decisions implementing in practice is the 
most relevant qualifying criteria for the as-
sessment of leadership.
Efficiency in taking a decision is a 
choice between several different alternatives 
(variants) followed by the action. The deci-
sion is related to the forecasting function of 
the manager, although it is present in other 
functions provided by members of the man-
agement team.
The choice of a particular decision is in-
fluenced by:
- Conclusions drawn from detailed anal-
ysis of the premises problem to be solved;
- The existence of alternative conditions 
the very possibility of a decision;
- Evaluation of alternatives by criteria of 
efficiency;
- The possibility of establishing the best 
decision in a period required.
Decision taking require from manag-
ers intelligence, knowledge and experience 
in the field, and that is showed in the qual-
ity and efficiency of decision. Given that fact, 
the manager has a specific purpose in mind 
when taking a decision and the effort is justi-
fied only to the extent that decision ensures 
positive prospects for that purpose.
In any company and especially in bank-
ing, decisions are made at all hierarchical 
levels. The importance of these decisions and 
the degree of difficulty related to a particular 
decision option can be appreciated according 
to following criteria:
- The period of time involved by the 
decision;
- Flexibility of actions which is devel-
oped based on the decision taken;
- Certainty of achieving goals;
- Human impact and quality of resourc-
es in this area to execute the decision in opti-
mal conditions during the established period 
of time.
In the banking system, the central bank 
has a major role. By the functions performed, 
by multilateral ties with other banks and, 
through them, with the economy, the central 
bank is a hub of the banking system.
There could be accepted some impor-
tant functions (minimum functions) of a cen-
tral bank today that are categorized in five 
areas (Collyns; 1983): 65 Change and Leadership
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a) currency issue and foreign exchange 
reserve management;
b) banker to the government;
c) banker to commercial banks;
d) regulation of the financial system;
e) monetary and credit policy.
There are, no doubt, many more 
functions as it is showed by the Bank for 
International Settlement that has published a 
complete list of approximately twenty sepa-
rate functions for a central bank.
Taken into consideration leadership 
in central banks the words of an important 
central banker could offer a genuine picture: 
“Central  bankers  are  conservative  people. 
They take great care in implementing policy; 
they speak precisely; they explain changes 
completely; and they study the environment 
trying to pinpoint where the next disaster 
looms. Good monetary policy is marked by 
its predictability, but when the world chang-
es, policymakers change with it. If a crisis hits 
and the tools at hand are not up to the job, 
then central bank officials can and will im-
provise.” (Cecchetti; 2008).
Nowadays, leadership of the cen-
tral banks have to face the following issues 
(Mendzela; 2003):
•  “organizational  structures  that  do 
not support current functions well;
• overload at the top through insuffi-
cient or ineffective delegation;
• difficulty in attracting and retaining 
talented people;
• a struggle to get creative outputs 
from policy functions;
•  proliferating  “internal  support”  de-
partments with growing resource levels;
• above-market remuneration paid to 
long-serving staff of limited future value;
• a lack of cost information and diffi-
culties in controlling costs.”
After international financial crisis, trust 
in central banks has declined and the reac-
tion of central banks to the crisis is generally 
judged as unsatisfactory by the general pub-
lic. The loss of credibility in central banks is 
preponderantly striking in Europe (see Panel 
A and B in Table 1). 
UK (BoE) Euro area (ECB) US (Fed)
Yes 28 19 23
No 34 43 41
Not sure 38 38 36
Net Balance -6 -24 -18
UK (BoE) Euro area (ECB) US (Fed)
Yes 28 19 23
No 34 43 41
Not sure 38 38 36
Net Balance -6 -24 -18
Table 1.Replies to the question: “Do you feel the Central Bank has responded appropriately to the challenges of the 
economic downturn?
Note: Euro area (ECB) population weighted based on data from panel B.
Panel B
Source: Harrisinteractive, 200866 Change and Leadership
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The loss of trust in central banks have 
wider implications on its independence that 
had broad public support. In this respect, the 
loss of credibility in the policy conducted by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) could be a 
cause of big concerns because “a monetary 
union whose central institution does not 
have the trust of its citizens is bound to run 
into political problems sooner or later” (Gros, 
Roth; 2009).
3. national Bank of Romania and 
leadership issues
The National Bank of Romania is man-
aged by a Board of Directors that is composed 
of nine members appointed by Parliament 
nominates the executive management for a 
period of 5 years, with possibility of renew-
al. Board members can not be MPs and can 
not do, according to law, of justice or public 
administration. Permanent executive struc-
ture consists of the National Bank governor 
and three deputy governors, one of whom 
is the first deputy governor. The other five 
members are not employees of the Central 
Bank. Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of National Bank of Romania is the NBR 
Governor Mugur Isărescu. NBR Governor is 
accountable to Parliament for regulating the 
monetary policy and banking supervision 
and monitoring.
The Board of Directors is the body with 
the right decision regarding monetary poli-
cies and exchange rate, licensing, regulation 
and prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions, oversight of payment systems, the inter-
nal organization of the bank. Board Decides 
also that the attributions of executive struc-
tures and NBR staff. NBR Board of Directors 
consists of nine members appointed by the 
Romanian Parliament for a period of 5 years. 
To ensure the effectiveness of decision-
making in the NBR are 4 operational struc-
tures responsible for exercising the main 
functions of a central bank:
• Monetary Policy Committee
• Supervisory Committee
• Reserve Management Committee
• Audit Committee.
Monetary Policy Committee established 
as a permanent structure in an advisory and 
decision-making consists of nine members 
and is led by central bank governor. The 
main tasks is to establish strategic coordinate 
monetary policy operational framework of its 
characteristics, objectives and guidelines on 
different time horizons, and measures to im-
prove and increase the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy and its operational framework, 
including in terms of harmonization with the 
requirements of the European Central Bank.
The Supervisory Committee is a per-
manent structure and decisional deliberative 
nature. It is composed of 10 members and 
is led by central bank governor. The duties 
and powers aimed at monitoring and evalu-
ation activities of the operation of credit in-
stitutions in terms of asset quality, financial 
performance and their classification in the 
regulated prudential indicators, and ensur-
ing regulatory base, according to specific 
laws and international practices in the field.
Reserve Management Committee is a 
permanent structure, composed of 11 mem-
bers and is led by central bank governor. 
Its main functions are to fulfill the strate-
gic guidelines adopted by the Board in the 
management of international reserves. The 
Committee shall establish a list of entities 
with which business trading in the securi-
ties of issuers for investment and the assets 67 Change and Leadership
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accepted for investment; make proposals on 
the implementation and use of financial in-
struments  (including  derivatives);  analyzes 
the markets and proposing strategy for the 
future.
The Audit Committee examines and 
proposes strategic directions and policy NBR 
internal control, risk management, internal 
and external audit. It consists of 5 members 
of the Board of Directors who are not part of 
the executive management of the bank.
In his capacity as monetary authority 
of Romania, National Bank is considering 
conducting monetary policy, financial sta-
bility, nationwide banking supervision and 
ensuring the smooth operation of payment 
systems. Following this task, there are many 
different levels of expectations in the econo-
my and society, namely population, compa-
nies, banks, government and international 
organizations.
The population expects the central bank 
to guarantee deposits at banks in monetary 
values as large as a result of bank regula-
tions that adopt to ensure the maintenance of 
a general price level as low as possible and 
have easier access to loans from banks.
The companies expect the central bank 
to facilitate quick access to bank lending on 
the basis of costs and bank charges as low 
and diversification that banks can offer com-
panies especially in terms of financing the 
activities, all based on measures monetary 
policy and rules set.
The government expects a strong part-
nership of the Central Bank regarding the 
management of macroeconomic policies be-
cause monetary policy is the prerogative of 
the central monetary authority and facilitat-
ing the financing needs of the state money 
through loans.
Banks expect from the National Bank a 
sound intervention on the money market in 
order to ensure liquidity and stability of the 
banking system and also the implementation 
of monetary policy that favors the develop-
ment of their activities and increases bank 
profitability.
International organizations expect from 
the central bank to be a guarantor of the 
country’s financial and economic stability, a 
guarantee of fulfillment of payment obliga-
tions of the Romanian state.
One of the essential characteristics that 
determine and influence leadership of a cen-
tral bank was to ensure that the degree of 
central bank independence from the political 
authorities of the country concerned. 
The activity of central banks and the 
conduct of monetary policy is guided by 
certain department, whose constituents 
are members appointed by various criteria. 
Thus, depending on whether the election of 
the governor and board members depend on 
the relationship between political power, one 
can determine the degree of independence of 
the central bank.
As many models used to quantify the 
degree of independence of the Central Bank, 
such a pattern is the one that developed le-
gal evidence of the independence and it is 
realized by Grili, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 
named GMT (in 1991), the authors making 
distinction between political and economic 
independence of the central bank.
The GMT model is based on some po-
litical independence criteria:
1) The appointment of the governor by 
the Government or Parliament;
2) The mandate of not less than 5 years;
3) The appointment of board members 
by the Government or Parliament;68 Change and Leadership
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4) Board members tenure is 5 years;
5) There is no government members in 
BM;
6) Credit policy and foreign exchange is 
exclusively the authority of the Central Bank;
7) The Central Bank pursues price sta-
bility,  which  is  an  objective  set  out  in  the 
statute;
8) Existence of legal provisions to sup-
port the bank’s position in the event of con-
flict with the government.
Concerning this particular point of 
view, worldwide, central banks raise their 
insubordination against politicians not to be 
confronted with more demanding obliga-
tions of reporting and transparency to the 
public. National Bank of Romania do not 
published the minutes of its board meetings 
and, consequently, the public knows nothing 
about the actual making monetary policy de-
cisions. The general public do not know what 
is discussed at these meetings, what are the 
votes of each of the members the NBR Board 
and how they argue their vote, nor their 
views on how consistent are the decisions 
taken. NBR, like many other central banks 
maintain an opacity of decision-taking that 
is driven monetary policy as the most impor-
tant operations in which it is implemented, in 
particular: how to establish key interest rate 
and reserve binding (RMO), and the opera-
tions of government securities.
In general, central bank officials justify 
their excessive secrecy in that transparency 
would prevent, in some cases, the effective 
transmission of monetary policy in the bank-
ing system and financial markets, while in 
others (such as emergency loans to banks in 
crisis liquidity) would be likely to cause bank 
panics and retreats, massive deposits from 
credit institutions “disclosed” so vulnerable 
(Mosoianu; 2012).
NBR has to audit the annual financial 
statements, like many companies, with the 
help of audit companies selected through 
auction and paid even by NBR. Usually, they 
are happy to find that these statements are 
prepared  “according  to  regulations”.  And 
the Court of Auditors controls only commer-
cial operations of the central bank or the pur-
chases of goods and services. A number of the 
world’s central banks publish their minutes 
of monetary policy meetings with a certain 
delay, ranging from several weeks to several 
months. The most notorious example of this 
is the Fed, the Czech National Bank and also 
the National Bank of England, Sweden and 
Mexico.
4. Difficult times for leadership in 
national Bank of Romania 
Before and during the international fi-
nancial crisis, NBR has faced some important 
and difficult problems, watershed might say, 
in terms of the proper functioning of its lead-
ership. These include: adopting the strategy 
of monetary policy based on inflation target-
ing, the speculative attack on the currency in 
the period 17 October to 5 November 2008 
and the liquidity crisis of Romanian banks 
with foreign capital.
a) Setting inflation targeting strategy
Monetary policy strategy of National 
Bank of Romania is inflation targeting, a 
strategy  adopted  in  August  2005,  after  a 
training process, concerning a functional 
testing framework for economic analysis and 
decision specific for direct inflation target-
ing. This type of monetary policy strategy 
imposes from the NBR leadership a comple-
tion of other requirements and criteria that 69 Change and Leadership
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determines the effectiveness of this strategy:
i. lowering the annual inflation rate be-
low 10 percent;
ii. gaining credibility for the central 
bank decisions and actions;
iii. strengthening the independence de 
jure (by entry into force on 30 July 2004 of the 
new Statute of the NBR) and de facto;
iv. restriction of fiscal dominance, fiscal 
consolidation and improving coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy;
v. ensure flexible exchange rate and 
reduce the vulnerability of the economy to 
changes in this variable;
vi. recovery and strengthening the 
banking system and the relative growth of 
bank intermediation;
vii. raising transparency and account-
ability of the central bank and the scope and 
intensity of communication with the public 
and financial markets, including issues relat-
ed to the new monetary policy strategy and 
the preparation of its adoption;
viii. shaping clearer macroeconomic 
behaviors and mechanisms of the economy 
needed to identify and increase the effective-
ness of monetary transmission channels.
NBR leadership approaches for creat-
ing organizational and technical framework 
necessary for the implementation of the new 
monetary policy strategy lasted 16 months 
and received technical assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund and the Czech 
National Bank (NBR; 2005).
Inflation targeting strategy adopted by 
BNR is characterized by:
- Expressing the inflation target in 
terms of headline inflation (consumer price 
index), given the public’s awareness and fa-
miliarity of the need to ensure transparency 
and credibility of monetary policy decisions;
-  Setting targets as mid-points with-
in an interval of variation (+ / -1 percentage 
point) in order to anchor inflation expecta-
tions effectively;
- Announcement of annual inflation 
targets for a longer time horizon (initially 2 
years), which emphasizes the necessary me-
dium-term perspective of monetary policy;
-  Continue practicing a managed float 
exchange rate;
-  Ex ante definition of a narrow set 
of  circumstances  (“exceptional  circum-
stances”),  independent  of  monetary  policy, 
which makes the central bank responsible for 
achieving the inflation target;
-  Setting the inflation target by 
the central bank in consultation with the 
government.
Similar experience of other central 
banks in the region that implements mon-
etary policy in the context of inflation tar-
geting strategy, the evolution of nature and 
values set by the central bank inflation tar-
gets so far are characterized by two distinct 
phases (NBR; 2012):
• step downward inflation targets set 
on a time horizon of two years annual fig-
ures for December (2005-2012), covering its 
major argument with the need to strengthen 
the disinflation and achieving sustainable an-
nual rate of inflation in the medium term;
• Stage a flat multi-annual inflation tar-
gets, consistent with the definition of price 
stability in the medium term in the Romanian 
economy (from 2013) is an interim period de-
signed to ensure the move to continue the in-
flation target in the long run - consistent with 
the definition of price stability adopted by 
the ECB. 
b)  Speculative  attack  on  the  national 
currency Leu70 Change and Leadership
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In the period October 17 to November 
5, 2008 there was an increase of the average 
interest rate on the interbank money market, 
well above the monetary policy interest rate, 
which led analysts NBR to say that there was 
a speculative attack on Leu. This attack has 
altered the flows of liquidity of commercial 
banks, thereby raising interest rates.
According Adviser to the Governor 
of central bank monetary policy Lucian 
Croitoru  (Croitoru;  2012),  a  speculative  at-
tack on the domestic currency can be defined 
by a large subsequent increasing of three in-
dicators - exchange rate, currency and net 
sales of foreign currency and interbank inter-
est rate - recorded in a short period time.
The literature recommends as response 
to the speculative attacks on national curren-
cy the increase of the monetary policy inter-
est rate. In October 2008, the National Bank 
of Romania has successfully countered the at-
tack on the national currency Leu, extracting 
liquidity from the money market by selling 
foreign currency and not by increasing the 
monetary policy interest rate. This response 
was an example of unconventional monetary 
policy measure and the motivation for the 
central bank leadership to take that kind of 
response to this attack was that of maintain-
ing financial stability and central bank cred-
ibility and reputation.
c)  Liquidity  crisis  of  Romanian  banks 
with foreign capital
As international financial crisis had 
struck Romanian financial system and econo-
my, the National Bank of Romania had to en-
sure money market liquidity. This objective 
was achieved through punctual intervention 
of the central bank on the money market and 
by the so-called Bank Coordination Initiative 
in Vienna on 31 March 2009, which IMF initi-
ated as a dialogue between the government 
and foreign banks operating in Romania, 
dialogue whose goal was to prevent closing 
refinancing credit lines from parent banks to 
their Romanian branches (Leoveanu; 2013-1). 
This quick response of international authori-
ties  (International  Monetary  Fund,  World 
Bank and European Union through European 
Central Bank) to help Romania was crucial 
in stopping the departure of foreign capital. 
Banks had to intake during this period about 
1.5 billion euro to their equity to be able to 
meet the criteria of solvency and liquidity 
regulations imposed by the National Bank of 
Romania and by international financial orga-
nizations (Leoveanu; 2013-2).
5. Conclusions
Definitely involved with the monetary 
issuance, in the process of lending and credit 
and currency control of the economy, in the 
currency exchange policy and other impor-
tant operations in terms of credit, the central 
bank acquires paramount importance for the 
economy, especially in terms of leadership 
and management specific to it.
In this regard, effective decision-tak-
ing is provided by competent decisions. 
Top-managers should not and can not by 
themselves ensure decision-making and 
decision-making competence because they 
distribute the hierarchical levels through del-
egation and decentralization decisions.
This raises a number of issues to be con-
sidered, such as:
- Crumbled compartments and multi-
plying the number of management positions;
- Diluting responsibility for work 71 Change and Leadership
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assigned personnel;
- Independence of staff and inability ex-
aggerated its effective coordination;
- Delaying the decision making and 
implementation;
- The deterioration of work between 
bosses and executives;
- Impaired administrative inertia tasks, 
delays and long delays, reduced professional 
competence, training muddled thinking and 
compromise decisions.
Leadership of the central bank will have 
to take into account the following:
- Creative ideas emanate from individu-
als who know and think about solving their 
problem
- If subordinates participate in the de-
velopment of a decision, they show greater 
commitment to meeting them, so it will work 
more on outcome
- The quality of a product produced in 
the group, compared to that of a product pro-
duced by an “ace” in the field varies accord-
ing to the skills of group members and the 
information available to them, plus the de-
gree of efficiency in the collective labor
- When a group of people is asked to 
solve a problem, the leader must think about 
their potential and their desire to solve the 
problem.
New concepts must be applied to de-
velop the leaders and the managers of central 
banks, such as: considering a central bank as 
an evolving business instead of a bureaucrat-
ic institution; encouraging innovative leaders 
for projects that are not mission-critical and 
aiming to build leadership, management and 
technical skills thinking on people and their 
capabilities (Mendzela; 2003).
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